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Protecting Private Property with Constitutional
Judicial Review: A Social Welfare Approach
PETER Z. GROSSMAN, DANIEL H. COLE*
Butler University; Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis

This article uses a social welfare approach to determine if and when the institution of constitutional
judicial review of property regulation and expropriation is efficient. A model is proposed in which
property rights protection is a component of social costs. Constitutional judicial review is assumed to
either add to or subtract on net from those costs, affecting social welfare generally. It will be shown that
under realistic conditions, reflected in real instances, that constitutional judicial review might not
enhance economic efficiency or overall social welfare. We show that the efficiency of constitutional
judicial review is likely to vary within the larger institutional context.

1. INTRODUCTION
To what extent, if at all, does constitutional judicial review efficiently protect
private property rights from government expropriation or over-regulation of
private property rights? The conventional phrase “judicial review” is in this
context modified by the adjective “constitutional” in order to avoid a potentially
misleading ambiguity. “Judicial review” simpliciter describes not a single power of
the courts but various powers that we seek to unpack by distinguishing between
“constitutional judicial review” and “statutory judicial review.” The former refers
to the powers of courts to (a) overturn duly enacted legislation and/or (b) require
some legislative action, such as payment of compensation, based on the courts’
interpretation of higher legal authority, usually in the form of a written
constitution. “Statutory judicial review,” by contrast, describes far the less potent
judicial authority to interpret, apply, and enforce legislation. In the US, courts
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exercise both constitutional and statutory judicial review. In the UK, by contrast,
courts exercise only statutory judicial review.1
This paper considers the social welfare implications of what we have defined
as “constitutional judicial review.” We presume that constitutional judicial
review is instituted in order to enhance social welfare by limiting the authority
of legislatures to enact laws that might otherwise reduce social welfare.2 One
such constitutional limitation on legislative authority is found in the Fifth
Amendment to the US Constitution, which prohibits the government –
specifically the federal government, but by extension of the Fourteenth
Amendment, state and local governments as well – from “taking private
property for public use, without just compensation.” The question is: does a
constitutional Takings Clause enhance social welfare, and if so, how much? In
its absence, would legislative/political institutions run roughshod over private
property rights, leading presumably to substantially lower levels of investment
and, in the aggregate, economic growth?
This paper looks primarily at the efficiency characteristics of constitutional
judicial review for protecting private property against expropriation or overregulation by governments, and examines the institution from a theoretical
standpoint by modeling the welfare costs and benefits that judicial review entails.
Like Komesar (2001), we are concerned with second-best alternatives; presumably,
we want, as Coase suggested (1964:195), to choose the institutional arrangement
that fails least. In some instances, it seems plausible that constitutional judicial
review would be the most efficient or (what amounts to the same thing) the least
inefficient solution to the problem of protecting private property rights. There
may be other cases, however, especially in countries with long established formal
and informal institutions of property rights protection, where the benefits from
constitutional judicial review, as Fischel (1995) argues and the empirical record
seems to confirm, are limited. In some circumstances, the social costs entailed by
the process of constitutional judicial review may not be worth the social benefits.
In those cases, the least inefficient solution could be to limit or even abandon the
use of constitutional judicial review.3
1 It might be argued that under the 1998 Human Rights Act, the UK courts can declare an
enactment of Parliament unconstitutional or, at least, inconsistent with constitutional principles,
but such a declaration cannot have the effect of negating the enactment. Only Parliament can
negate, repeal, or amend an act of Parliament (Cole, 2007a:165-66).
2 It is conceivable, however, that the power of constitutional judicial review might have a
purpose other than, or in addition to, enhancement of social welfare. For example, it might be
instituted to enhance the authority of some interest groups, (for example, judges) over others
(such as legislators) regardless of social welfare effects.
3 As a practical matter, in the US this would require a constitutional amendment to repeal the
Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause. Since repeal itself would entail substantial transaction costs, a
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The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we sketch a model of
social welfare incorporating constitutional judicial review. In section three, we
consider three hypothetical cases to examine under what conditions the
benefits of constitutional judicial review of government regulations and
expropriations of private property will be on net a social cost or benefit. In
section four, we review empirical examples from the UK and the US that raise
questions about the efficiency of constitutional judicial review in a system with
well-established formal and informal norms of property rights. A concluding
section discusses the context of constitutional judicial review and suggests
avenues for future research.
As a caveat, we should add that this paper makes no arguments and draws no
conclusions about the propriety or desirability of constitutional judicial review
for purposes other than protecting private property against government
expropriation or over-regulation. We do not suppose, for example, that the
socially optimal level of constitutional judicial review for protecting private
property rights would necessarily be the same as the optimal level for
protecting rights of free speech, religious liberty, voting, or due process. There
is no ex ante warrant to believe that all rights would be equally well protected by
political or judicial institutions. To the contrary, there is reason to suppose that
differential levels of constitutional judicial review might be desirable,
depending on the structure of incentives, which may differ across various legal
or constitutional rights. For instance, judicial review is likely to be particularly
valuable for protecting “discreet and insular minorities,” whose rights are
unlikely to be protected by majoritarian political interests (United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 US 144, 153 n.4 (1938); Ely, 1980). This was, in fact, James Madison’s
concern about private property owners (Ely, 1998:54). Our reading of English
legal history and the positive political economy literature suggests that Madison
may have been wrong to believe that property owners constitute a vulnerable
minority. Even if we are right about that, however, constitutional judicial
review might still be warranted to protect other constitutional rights belonging
to minority groups that are truly vulnerable to majoritarian oppression. This
paper, however, is concerned only with the social welfare implications of
constitutional judicial review for protecting private property rights against
government expropriation or over-regulation.

further analysis would be needed to determine that the cost of continuing to live with, and abide
by, the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause exceeded the cost of repealing that clause.
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2. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK: A SOCIAL WELFARE MODEL
The economic literature has for many years grappled with the problem of
modeling social welfare. When it is represented in functional form, it usually takes
on a character such as W = ∑aiWi(Ui) where social welfare (W) is a weighted sum
of each individual’s utility ordering. As Arrow (1950) pointed out long ago, a social
welfare function faces an insuperable aggregation problem in that interpersonal
utility, which is in each case an ordinal ranking, cannot be sensibly aggregated
(Craven, 1992). Still, such functions (or “functionals” as they are sometimes called)
are often used to at least explicate the direction of social welfare maximization.
For our purposes, we have chosen a simpler functional argument. In “The
Problem of Social Cost,” Coase (1960) chose to address the welfare goal as a
vaguely expressed maximization of “the social product” generally thought to be
the total, or the optimal, output. We follow this basic approach with a
“Coasian” social product function as a proxy for social welfare. This does not
truly circumvent the problems inherent in social welfare models since output
will depend partly on demand functions that stem from implicit interpersonal
utility calculations, and thus the aggregation problem remains. But this form
allows for a clear means of weighing some potential efficiency aspects of
constitutional judicial review as they affect the costs of transactions.
We assume, therefore, a social welfare function in which the goal is wealth
creation and the goal of society is to maximize the social product (П). This
function is a summation across producers within society and represents
efficient production. The functional form is:
П = ∑PY(x) – [C(x) + T(x, α(J), J)]

(1)

In this equation, the social product depends on the value of output: a price level
(P) and total output (Y) which is a function of a vector of inputs, x. Effectively
Y(x) represents a general production function in which (x) includes inputs broadly
defined to take in all resources that are required of the transformation process. All
producers are assumed to seek to maximize profits, and the sum of the output
levels of all producers multiplied by prices equals the value of social product. The
level of social product, of course, depends on costs, and output will be assumed
to expand until marginal benefits are equal to marginal costs.
Thus, the cost component C(x) + T(x, α(J), J) is the crucial element that
determines the level of social product.4 This component consists of two
4 It is not assumed that there is a specification of optimal (or best possible) property rights that
is, or can be, attained. This cost function examines instead an aspect of the cost of enforcement
of property rights through judicial review.
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elements, C and T. The former represents transformational costs, the costs of
factors of production that go into generating social product. It is a function of
a vector of inputs (x) and will be rising as production increases. The second
cost term T represents transaction costs. In the world of the so-called “Coase
Theorem,” T would be set equal to zero. But given the reality of exchange
relations, contracts, monitoring, measurement, property rights and so on, T will
always be positive. Indeed, without these transactional aspects of exchange,
production does not occur and no benefits can be realized.
Consequently, transaction costs are also a function of a vector of inputs that
go into generating the social product. And like the transformational variable, T
is positively related to x.
But transaction costs are also a function of the institutional matrix (North, 1997).
Most importantly, transaction costs are affected by the structure of property
rights, which facilitates or impedes exchange. The property rights structure is
substantially a function of legal definition and enforcement by executive-branch
agencies, and/or legislative bodies. The rules that define and secure private
property rights are designated here by what we are terming the institutional
variable α. In general, it is assumed that α is positively related to T (North, 1997).
That is, the process of defining and enforcing property rights though the judicial,
executive and/or legislature branches of government entails costs. The more
effort that is expended in defining and enforcing such rights, the more costs are
imposed. However, the costs will vary according to the nature of the legal system
and other features of the institutional environment. We assume that every
country has an institutional structure designated by α, but for the purposes of
this model the institutional structure need not be the same in each society, and
the costs different institutional structures impose on transactions may vary. In
other words, transaction costs related to property rights in country i are not
necessarily identical to those in country j. We assume that when it is difficult to
delineate property relations or to enforce property rights, transaction costs will
be high. A very high value for T(α) (a highly uncertain environment for
exchange) means total costs will be high and the social product low. A low value
of T(α) conversely would mean that transaction costs related to property rights
are low and so the cost of exchange is low. Very well defined property rights
would in fact reduce the cost of production and exchange, while poorly defined
rights would mean that transaction costs are high, adding substantial costs to
exchange, and therefore reducing the social product. (In theory T(α) could be so
high that no exchange would be possible.)
While we assume for simplicity that transaction costs rise with efforts to increase
the security of private property rights, it is clear that some changes in the rules and
their enforcement will actually lower costs. For purposes of this analysis, we are
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art10
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1309

238 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

5:1, 2009

assuming only that one institutional factor will change the cost of securing private
property, and that factor is constitutional judicial review.5 Thus, it is assumed that α
is a function of constitutional judicial review (α = f(J)), and the standard
expectation is that they are negatively related. That is, as J rises, there is more clarity
in the definition and security of property rights, and so the cost of exchange falls
(except if the judiciary are corrupt, self-interested or incompetent, as we discuss in
the next section). It is assumed that T(α) > 0 in all cases. If T(α) were in fact equal
to zero, all costs related to property rights would be zero and judicial review would
be irrelevant. Where no judicial review exists, of course, α(J) = 0.
It is further assumed in (1) that transaction costs (T) are themselves affected
by constitutional judicial review (J). The process itself (litigation, enforcement,
etc.) creates social costs, and the uncertainty created by potential litigation and
redistribution of rights imposes positive costs on market participants. Indeed, it
can be said that if judicial review were costless, it would always be beneficial
(that is it would always lower T(α)). But of course it is not costless. As courts
introduce more judicial review, transaction costs through T(J) rise (although
T(α), and transaction costs overall, may either fall or rise as a consequence).
In this model, the standard maximization assumption applies. That is, the
marginal benefit—here the value of the marginal product of output—must
equal the marginal cost of those resources. Since a price level is a given, the
marginal benefit will be determined by the marginal product. We assume
diminishing returns and therefore the marginal product increases at a
diminishing rate, and so social product is increased the lower the level at which
the value of the marginal product equals marginal costs.
Marginal costs can be expressed as a sum:

dC dT dT dT
= MC
+
+
+
dx dx dα dJ

(2)

The key innovation in this structure is the potential role of constitutional
judicial review. To understand the role of constitutional judicial review, T must
be differentiated with respect to J and α, which in turn is differentiated with
respect to J. This yields:

Clearly this is a simplification. Other institutional factors can lower the cost of securing
property rights. Indeed, one could easily have a function for α containing several arguments that
would bear on the cost of exchange. There could also be an endogeniety issue in that a low T(α)
country could have reached that point because it has judicial review. For the purposes of this
analysis, however, the institutional background is taken as given and only constitutional judicial
review will change its impact on transaction costs.
5
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dT dT ∂T ∂α ∂T
+
=
•
+
dα dJ ∂α ∂J ∂J

(3)

(+) (-) (+)
This equation suggests, as we argue below, that constitutional judicial review of
government regulation and expropriation of private property has ambiguous
effects on social cost and hence on social product. First, as property rights are
delineated and protected, transaction costs ∂T rise. We can assume, therefore,
∂α

that the effect of changing or securing property rights is to raise the marginal
social cost of transactions. However, it is further assumed that, in general,
constitutional judicial review lowers costs because it clarifies and protects private
property rights. In that case, ∂α would be negative, implying that the first term on
∂J

the right side of the equation is negative. In other words, constitutional judicial
review should lower the marginal costs of transactions overall.
But the second term, ∂T , certainly is positive. Constitutional judicial review
∂J

imposes transaction costs of its own. As noted, there are litigation and
enforcement costs. Moreover, there is some uncertainty as to whether or not
judicial review will resolve issues connected to the security of rights. As the
process of judicial review unfolds, property rights remain uncertain or mutable
with respect to government action until a rule has been litigated, and possibly
even after litigation if the courts failed to adequately define or protect them.
Producers and property holders generally need to expend resources on, among
other things, legal services and information. Lingering uncertainty may raise costs
over time as the prospect, indeed just the possibility, of additional litigation
requires added expenditures of resources on legal, financial, and other services.
But what about the sum of the terms? The standard assumption among legal
scholars is that the reduction in costs through the sure enforcement of property
rights because of constitutional judicial review will lower transaction costs
generally. That is, judicial review will reduce T(α) and this is assumed to exceed
the cost of the process. But since courts, through constitutional judicial review,
have the power to overturn laws that redistribute property rights (or to raise the
cost of transactions by requiring compensation) producers generally will have to
take into account the implicit and explicit costs of the review process. On that
basis, constitutional judicial review could cost more than it creates in benefits,
lowering the social product. In that event, so far from being necessary to property
rights protection and economic efficiency, it would be a burden.

http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art10
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Put more simply, constitutional judicial review is efficiency enhancing overall
only when the following condition is met:
 ∂T ∂α  ∂T
−
•
>
 ∂α ∂J  ∂J

(4)

In other words, constitutional judicial review only raises the social product
when the value of the reduction in marginal costs from the further definition
and protection of private property rights exceeds the marginal cost of
providing constitutional judicial review.

3. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATIONS
The question then is: when in fact does constitutional judicial review lower
social costs and when does it raise them? We consider three general
possibilities: the standard case, the “corrupt” judiciary case, and the welldefined property rights economy.

3.1. THE STANDARD CASE
The assumption among US legal scholars and jurists is essentially that judicial
review inevitably lowers T(α) by a far greater percentage than it raises costs. The
literature suggests that property rights would be trampled even though the US has
a representative government made up of many property holders (Ely, 1998; Epstein,
1985). Those who claim that judicial review is a necessary condition for the
maintenance of effective property rights are arguing in the terms laid out above
that, in the absence of constitutional judicial review, the value of T(α) would be
very high, leading to correspondingly high costs of production and exchange.
Yet, the ability of constitutional judicial review to lower costs to a great
degree depends on the existence of an independent judiciary and reliable
enforcement mechanisms. This leads to a curious outcome: Judicial review
should have its greatest net benefit where there is a potentially predatory
government and ill-defined property rights, but this predatory government has
to be one that does not interfere either with an independent judiciary or the
enforcement arms of the law. It would work best, therefore, in an environment
where predators are restrained to a considerable degree whether there is
constitutional judicial review or not.

Review of Law & Economics, © 2009 by bepress
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3.2. “CORRUPT” JUDICIARY
The assumption of the standard case is that the judiciary acts in the public
interest and that judges use judicial review to clearly define and strengthen
property rights institutions. But there is no reason to believe that the judiciary
always acts in the best interest of society. Indeed, Public Choice theory makes a
convincing case that judges as well as legislators typically act in their own
interest (Mueller, 1989). Where the judiciary is known to be corrupt or
corruptible, the outcome of constitutional judicial review is unlikely to lower
the costs of exchange. The same outcome may be true when the judiciary is not
corrupt but simply self-interested, incompetent or merely inadequate to the
task of processing the information needed to determine the optimal level of
protection for private property rights.
Equation 4 presumes that the term ∂α is negative: judicial review facilitates
∂J

exchange and so lowers transaction costs. But a corrupt judiciary could use
constitutional judicial review to make exchange more costly and lead to a ∂α > 0.
∂J

In this instance, constitutional judicial review adds doubly to transaction costs:
Both through the cost of the process and now also from the result. This would of
course raise transaction costs and lower the social product.
A corrupt judiciary is, of course, not just a hypothetical problem. There is no
inherent reason to assume, even in rule-of-law states, that the judiciary will
never act pursuant to some agenda that in fact lowers social welfare.

3.3. WELL-DEFINED PROPERTY RIGHTS
Consider a country with a long tradition of rule of law, property rights
protection, social norms that validate property ownership, contract
enforcement, clear property titles and other features of an economic and social
system that is receptive to economic exchange. In this context, the efficiency of
judicial review is most ambiguous.
Suppose, for example, that constitutional judicial review always will redefine
or enforce property rights in such a way as to make exchange more certain. But
in this instance, exchange already is highly certain. The amount by which the
value of α changes with respect to J cannot be large since the magnitude of
T(α) is already small. True, the risk of predatory behavior by the legislature
remains, but if this does not conform with informal institutions or within
formal legal traditions, it seems the potential for predation is low and unlikely
to be reduced to zero even if constitutional judicial review is introduced. In
other words, the gain from judicial review, even if we assume it to be positive,
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art10
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may fall short of the costs. The condition expressed in equation (4) will not be
met since the right hand term will be larger than the one on the left.
Indeed, as we discuss in the next section there are cases in which there is no
constitutional judicial review of legislation but where political institutions have
long respected and protected private property rights.

4. EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES AND THEORIES OF
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
Cole (2007a) has shown that political institutions have protected property rights
quite well in the United Kingdom, even though that country’s courts lack the
power of constitutional judicial review. That is to say, the UK’s courts cannot
overturn acts of Parliament or force Parliament to pay compensation when it
expropriates or regulates private property rights. This finding surprises many
jurists (particularly in America), who tend to presume, often quite casually, that in
the absence of vigilant judicial protection under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause property rights in the US would quickly be ground into dust by rampant
legislators and regulators. In other words, American legal scholars presume that
constitutional judicial review is a strictly necessary institution without which
private property rights would not long survive. And without well-protected
private property rights, both liberty and economic productivity would be lost.
This view has been articulated by jurists as diverse as James Madison (Ely, 1998:54),
Oliver Wendell Holmes (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US 393, 415-6 (1922)), and
Antonin Scalia (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992)).
In contrast to the presumed expectations of American jurists, private property
rights have not disappeared in the UK. Indeed, Parliament only rarely
expropriates anyone’s private property by eminent domain; and when it does take
title, Parliament virtually always pays compensation, even though no court in the
land can force it to do so (Cole, 2007a). Generally speaking, Parliament acts as if its
power to expropriate were limited by constitutional judicial review. Like
legislatures in the United States, which are constrained by the Fifth
Amendment’s Taking Clause, Parliament usually regulates the use of private
property without paying compensation. But when Parliament’s regulations
deprive privately owned lands of virtually all economic value or it simply takes
away title, Parliament invariably compensates. For example, in the Town and
County Planning Act of 1947, as amended in 1990, Parliament provided for
landowners to be compensated if the denial of planning permission left their land
without any “reasonable beneficial use” (Cole, 2007a). This provision has much the
same effect as the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 US 1003 (1992). The UK’s Town and County Planning Act also
Review of Law & Economics, © 2009 by bepress
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allows for consideration of landowners’ reasonable and legitimate “development
expectations,” which is analogous to the “reasonable, investment-backed
expectations” test the US Supreme Court enunciated in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York, 438 US 104 (1978). Apparently, the UK has managed to
achieve a roughly similar outcome, but without incurring the costs associated
with instituting and exercising constitutional judicial review.
The reasons for Parliament’s self-restraint are, no doubt, rooted in the customs
and conventions—the informal institutions—of English legal history, which may
(or may not) differ markedly from those of US legal history. But Parliament’s selfrestraint is also explained to some extent by recent theories of positive political
economy, which should apply equally to legislative bodies in the US.
Whatever the reasons for its remarkable―and to many American jurists,
incomprehensible―self-restraint, the fact remains that Parliament very
substantially protects private property rights in the UK even without the
constraints of constitutional judicial review. According to the Heritage
Foundation’s annual Index of Economic Freedom, the UK regularly receives the
highest ranking for protecting property rights (1.0), the same score the US
receives. According to another ranking (Gwartney and Lawson, 2004), the UK ranks
fifth in the world, 11 positions ahead of the US, for “Legal Structure and Security
of Property Rights.” Whatever the merits of such rankings, it seems clear that the
UK has a positive reputation for protecting private property rights, despite lacking
constitutional judicial review. Consequently, according to the model set out in the
last section, if constitutional judicial review were instituted in the UK any positive
impact on α would likely be relative small, smaller perhaps than the cost ∂T . In
∂J

other words, constitutional judicial review in the UK could fail the condition
specified for efficiency in equation (4).
The long history of political protection of private property rights in the United
Kingdom cuts strongly against the notion that constitutional judicial review is in
fact strictly necessary to protect the institution of private property. Moreover,
recent theories of positive political economy provide reasons for believing that
democratic political/legislative institutions, especially at higher levels of
government, can be expected to protect the rights of private property owners,
who are far from constituting a “vulnerable minority” (Cole, 2007a). For example,
Sened (1997) finds that completely self-interested, rent-seeking governments can be
expected to establish and enforce private property rights in order to secure
political and military support, as well as revenues, necessary for their survival.
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Knack and Keefer (1995) both demonstrate that secure
property rights are an important component of the state’s institutional structure
because they provide a necessary basis for capitalization and economic exchange,
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art10
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which result in economic growth and provide revenues, via taxation, to the
government. Empirical information confirms that governments which do not
provide secure property rights do not survive as long. According to Clague et al.
(1996), property and contract rights are significantly associated with a proxy for the
time horizons for autocrats (the log of years in power) and, in democracies, with
the duration of democratic government. This does not necessarily mean that
property institutions will be structured to maximize social welfare. North (1981:22)
rightly notes that “[p]roperty rights that produce sustained economic growth have
seldom held sway throughout history...” However, it is clear that governments
have at least some substantial incentive to provide and secure private property
rights. To the extent they do not do so, Sened (1997:101) suggests the basic problem
may be incomplete information.
Taken together, modern theories of positive political economy and the
historical evidence from the UK suggest that the institution of constitutional
judicial review may provide rather less marginal social benefit than many jurists
commonly suppose.
Other scholars, both from economic and legal perspectives, have started to
question the efficiency of constitutional judicial review. Economist William
Fischel (1995), for example, has argued that private property owners often are
able to protect their own interests through their use of political processes,
without recourse to the courts. Legal scholar Neil Komesar (2001), meanwhile,
has questioned not the theoretical value of judicial review (which he endorses)
but rather the practical ability of the courts to meet the need and effectively
limit government incursions on private property rights. Komesar makes an
efficiency argument that judicial institutions may fail so badly that a secondbest alternative of a “corrupt, excessive, and repressive [legislative] regulatory
process” may actually cause property owners less harm (2001:106).
Though critics of constitutional judicial review for protecting private property
rights have made plausible arguments against its efficiency, none have
subjected the concept of judicial review to a general welfare analysis.
Theoretically, there may be cost-reducing effects from judicial review, but the
process is itself costly. Thus, the question arises as to whether the social
benefits of constitutional judicial review always (or ever) outweigh its costs.
Note that the costs entail not only the transaction costs of the legal system but
also the prospect that judicial rulings will overturn legislative action and lead to
greater uncertainty about property rights and enforcement. Simply put, it has
not yet been established in the literature under what conditions the benefits of
judicial review actually make it the least (or a less) costly alternative.
It is worth noting that the UK is not the only example of a country that relies
predominantly on political institutions to protect private property rights. The
Review of Law & Economics, © 2009 by bepress
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same is true for many other commonwealth countries (Allen, 2000). Even in the US,
where property rights are constitutionally protected, it would be inaccurate to
assume that property rights are enforced only by the courts. Legislative bodies
also protect property rights. Consider, for example, the aftermath of the US
Supreme Court’s widely unpopular decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). In Kelo the Court ruled (not for the first time) that
eminent domain takings for the purpose of economic development could satisfy
the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The majority’s decision was
based on several precedents extending back for more than 100 years (Cole, 2006).
However, Justice O’Connor, in dissent, argued vehemently that the Court in Kelo
had undermined all private property rights in the United States by leaving it
“vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it
might be upgraded” (Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2671, O’Connor, J. dissenting).
The Court’s ruling in Kelo led to a surprising (to legal scholars at least) public
backlash, as property-rights advocates, the news media, and state and federal
legislators on both sides of the aisle lashed out against the Court’s failure to
uphold the institution private property (Cole, 2006, 2007b). As a direct consequence,
virtually every state legislature in the United States considered, and more than
three dozen actually enacted, new laws at least purporting to constrain the power
of eminent domain. As of this writing, more than 400 separate legislative
proposals to limit eminent domain are still awaiting action in state legislative
bodies (Cole, 2007b:10543).6 The vast majority of these measures will never be
enacted into law, but some will be enacted, and of those at least a few are likely to
impose substantial limits on the power of eminent domain. Indeed, some of the
measures already enacted in the wake of Kelo impose constraints that are
significantly more protective of private property rights than any the dissenters in
Kelo (with the exception of Justice Thomas7) would have imposed.
To cite one example: The State of Indiana’s new eminent domain law, H.B.
1010, enacted in March 2006, responds directly to Kelo by imposing a restrictive
definition of “public use,” which excludes “economic development, including
an increase in a tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic
health.” Indiana further limits the use of eminent domain to “public
nuisances,” “fire hazards,” “structures unfit for human habitation,” and
“unimproved or vacant” lands. Sites that do not fall into one or another of
these categories cannot be condemned. And for sites that still can be taken,
H.R. 1010: requires takers to make “good faith” efforts to purchase the
For example, http://maps.castlecoalition.org/legislation.html.
Justice Thomas would interpret the phrase “public use” literally to allow eminent domain
takings only in cases where the land would be devoted to use by the public, such as public roads
and public parks.
6

7
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property before resorting to eminent domain; allows landowners who fight
against eminent domain to seek reasonable attorneys fees; and provides for
super-compensation (i.e., above market value). In the case of agricultural lands,
the government must pay 125% of fair market value; and for occupied
residential properties, the government must pay 150% of fair market value. In
sum, Indiana’s new eminent domain statute very substantially restricts the use
of eminent domain in that state. It constitutes legislative protection of property
rights against legislative or administrative incursion; it provides evidence in
support of the positive political economic theories of property discussed
earlier; and it all but rules out the need for constitutional judicial review to
protect private property rights in the State of Indiana.
Indiana’s new eminent domain statute may not be representative. Statutes
enacted in other states may be more or less protective of private property
rights. But the fact remains that, in the wake of Kelo, political bodies are
responding to the perceived demand for more protection of private property.
To the extent state legislatures are responsive and protect private property
rights, the social value of constitutional judicial review for accomplishing the
same purpose is arguably reduced. As suggested by the model elaborated in
Section 2, constitutional judicial review can provide incrementally greater
protection for private property rights on top of the protection already provided
by the political system (although that does not seem, in fact, to be the case with
respect to limitations on eminent domain in the US), but only at some positive
cost. The question, as always, concerns the marginal costs and benefits of
providing further increments of protection for property rights through the
institution of constitutional judicial review.
Some might argue that the Court’s ruling in Kelo maximized social welfare
according to the basic “social product” model we have delineated in Section 2.
That is, the first term on the right of equation (1) might have been larger with the
court’s ruling that without it. But this seems unlikely for several reasons. First, had
there been no constitutional judicial review, the outcome of the dispute would
have been the same – condemnation of the plaintiffs’ properties – but without
attendant court costs.8 Second, if the plaintiffs subjectively valued their homes
more highly than the Court’s assessment of “just compensation,” they could have
suffered what Michelman (1967) refers to as “demoralization” costs – losses of
It could, perhaps, be argued that the Kelo decision contributed to social welfare by spurring
legislatures to enact welfare-enhancing laws protecting property rights, but such an attenuated effect
would be difficult to credit because: (a) there is no evidence that the Court decided Kelo with the aim
of spurring legislation (although Justice Stevens noted that states could provide greater protections
for private property, if they wished to do so); and (b) the political outrage that drove the legislation
might have been just as great, or greater, in the absence of constitutional judicial review.
8
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utility greater than the benefits from enhanced production.9 Demoralization costs
could also have affected other property owners including, for example, small
producers and start-up companies, that might have been deterred from making
productive investments out of fear that the government would later forcibly
transfer their properties to larger corporations.
Even if constitutional judicial review in Kelo had unambiguously enhanced
social welfare, it would not have answered the following counterfactual: In a
country like the US, would the social costs have been higher and/or the
benefits lower had constitutional judicial review been unavailable? All that is
really clear from the Kelo case is that state legislatures in the U.S. are sensitive to
political pressures to maintain strong property rights; they would likely do so to
a significant extent even in the absence of constitutional judicial review. And
avoiding judicial review would clearly have saved the costs ( ∂T ) of applying it.
∂J

Moreover, while the model in Section 2 looks at marginal changes, ultimately
the question is: does the sum of the marginal changes from constitutional
judicial review across the run of cases reduce or increase net social welfare?

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
There is undoubtedly a substantial amount of anecdotal evidence on the costs
and benefits of constitutional judicial review in different countries. Over 50
countries in the world have Constitutional Courts tasked with overturning laws
that violate constitutional provisions. Comparisons can be made between
countries with and without constitutional judicial review at similar levels of
development, as well as between countries with review procedures but
different perceived levels of economic freedom.
Indeed, many countries despite judicial review are notable for high levels of
corruption and weak enforcement of property rights. Russia, for example, has a
constitutional court but is also considered extremely corrupt (147 out of 180
on the transparency index) with poor protection of property rights. Poland, a
country that has undergone a similar transition to a market economy and is at a
comparable level of development to Russia, also has a constitutional court. But
Poland is rated 58th with respect to corruption and is considered to have a
greater respect for property rights.10 It would be instructive to analyze the
consequences of constitutional rulings with respect to property rights in both
9 Strictly, Michelman focused on cases of non-compensation rather than under-compensation.
But his basic arguments about demoralization costs apply in both contexts.
10 Respect for property rights is taken from the Heritage Foundation’s 2004 Index of Economic Freedom;
the corruption ranking is from the Transparency International 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index.
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of these countries. How have judicial decisions by the constitutional courts
impacted the rights of property holders and markets for property in those
countries? Of course, as we have suggested, a comparison of the larger
institutional structure would be needed to assess the magnitude of T(α) .
The model we have proposed may also provide a basis for quantitative tests
of constitutional judicial review. Cost comparisons could include the
difficulty/costliness of utilizing the courts and the costs of court enforcement.
Further, comparisons might also look at property markets in these countries to
assess whether rulings have made an impact on the cost of title transfers and
the perceived security of title itself. In general, asset valuations, legal costs, title
insurance rates across countries, might provide more or less accurate ways of
estimating the effects on transaction costs from constitutional judicial review,
and provide estimates of values for the variables in this paper’s model.
Experiments might also be structured to test the market effects of constitutional
judicial review. For example, “judges” might be presented with cases involving
property rights under varying conditions, in which their decisions might make title
more or less secure against government expropriation, make land assembly for
(re)development more or less costly, or otherwise impact overall social welfare. It
might then be examined what the court will rule if (a) there is a tradition of
property protection that is thought to be in everyone’s interest; (b) bribery is
tolerated but (a) generally applies; (c) bribery is typical but arguments to a
“judges’” self-interest may be made that include taking the lesser bribe; (d) courts
cannot rule but a “legislature” makes the rules under similar kinds of incentives as
those above. Obviously, various kinds of institutions may be added to the
proceedings to observe how and why the behavior of participants changes.
The model might also be expanded beyond constitutional judicial review to
include other variables that would affect the value of T(α). Here the variable J
is a limited subset of the legal factors that might raise or lower the costs of
exchange. For example, in the US and elsewhere, courts rule on property cases
concerning nuisance and trespass that can have important effects on the
definition and enforcement of property rights. Similarly, courts routinely decide
cases that either strengthen or reduce the cost of contracting and hence the
costs of deferred exchange. This paper, however, focuses exclusively on the
issue of constitutional judicial review and its effects on property rights for two
reasons: First, because constitutional judicial review plays an obviously
prominent role in establishing and securing property rights in the US; second,
because many legal scholars claim that constitutional judicial review is a necessary
institution for protecting property rights to maximize the social product.
Our model and evidence provide reasons to question whether constitutional
judicial review is as important as those scholars have asserted, and most
Review of Law & Economics, © 2009 by bepress
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American jurists casually assume. It would seem that the underlying
institutions, and the place of property rights among those institutions, are at
least as important. Constitutional judicial review without a basic social and legal
prominence for property rights protection may not guarantee that such review
will secure rights, and may not be efficiency enhancing. Basic respect for
property rights within the legal and social tradition may also make
constitutional judicial review a (comparatively) inefficient institution. Arguably,
it might obviate the need for constitutional judicial review at all.
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